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The EU and the ‘Problem’ of Illegal Logging:
the Case of the EU-Malaysia VPA
Marjolein DEROUS*
Malaysia was the first country in Asia to start negotiations for a Voluntary Partnership
Agreement (VPA) with the European Union (EU). These VPAs are the core of the EU’s
external forest governance and stem from the 2003 Forest Legality Enforcement, Governance
and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan. Both aim to govern the ‘problem’ of illegal logging. This
article presents two investigations. First, it looks at the process of problematization: what is the
problem represented to be? In other words, how is the problem delineated and what assumptions
underlie this representation? To this end, this article presents a thorough analysis of the FLEGT
Action Plan, puts together the pieces of the problem, and links them to the coherence of the EU
as a global actor. Second, the article delves into resistance to this governing in the case of
Malaysia. In the VPA processes, the EU expects local actors to articulate their interests and
streamline their knowledge to reach an optimal definition of legal logging. These expectations
however obscure a history of diverging interests and legal battles in Malaysia. The second part of
this article investigates how local actors such as indigenous peoples’ groups, timber producers and
state-level politicians have come to resist the VPA and its governing in a series of opting-out and
walking out.
1 INTRODUCTION
In May 2003, the European Union (EU) presented its Forest Law Enforcement
Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan. The Plan embodies the efforts of
the EU and its Member States to govern illegal logging in forests around the
world and has an internal and an external component. The former went on to
produce EU legislation to prevent illegally produced timber to be placed the
EU market; the latter in Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs).1|2 A VPA
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1 The European Timber Regulation (EUTR) prohibits the placement of illegally harvested timber on
the EU market (Regulation (EU) No 995/2010).
2 As of Jan. 2019, nine VPAs have been agreed and are in various stages of implementation (Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Ghana, Liberia, Republic of the Congo, Indonesia, Guyana, Honduras,
Vietnam), with six more being negotiated (Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon,
Laos, Malaysia, Thailand). In 2016 Indonesia became the first country to issue FLEGT licenses.
is a trade agreement that aims to ensure that the timber exported to the EU
from the partner country in question is verified as compliant with local laws. It
brings about a Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS) that deals with a
definition of legality, supply chain control, verification of compliance, licensing
and an independent audit. The entire VPA process requires the structured
participation of civil society in the four phases of preparation, negotiation,
implementation and operation. Relevant stakeholders are those involved in
the enforcement of forestry related legislation, operating in the forest sector
or affected by forest operations. The end product of a VPA process is a FLEGT
license: a label on log shipments that proves that they were obtained in
accordance to local laws.
The VPA process with Malaysia specifically deserves our attention. The
EU-Malaysia VPA negotiations, the first with a country in Southeast Asia,
started in January 2007. Over a decade later, however, the talks have yet to
produce an agreement. Discussions came to a halt over the walk out of a
significant part of the civil society groups and the decision of the province of
Sarawak – the largest producer of timber of the country – to not participate in
the future VPA.
From a critical perspective, this article presents two related investigations
into FLEGT and the EU-Malaysia VPA. Firstly, I approach the FLEGT
initiative and EU external forest governance from the What is the Problem
Represented to be? (WPR) approach for policy analysis.3 This approach looks
at policies not as solutions for natural or objective problems waiting to be
addressed, but rather as processes of producing problems of a specific kind.
Such a view helps us better understand policy by tracing it back to underlying
assumptions within problem representations. I assess what kind of problems
the EU wants to address with FLEGT and the VPA, how certain issue are
problematized while others are not, and link these to prior assumptions about
the ‘place’ of forests, the ‘need’ for management and the ‘appropriate’ means
to do so. Secondly, I view the EU-Malaysia VPA negotiations as a case of
resistance to this governing and its problematizations or, in Foucauldian
terms, counter-conduct. In short, Foucault studied power in modern forms
of governing, or the ‘art of government’ (governmentality, see infra), and he
emphasized how governing and resistance are mutually constitutive. This is
not an analysis of mass protests, but rather an emphasis on the relational
character of power. It is both a question of how those that resist governing
do so, and a view on resistance as an essential part of and even potentially
3 C. Bacchi & S. Goodwin, Poststructural Policy Analysis: A Guide to Practice (Palgrave 2016).
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reinforcing ‘government’.4 The investigation into the counter-conduct in the
case of the EU-Malaysia VPA reveals how local problematizations and those
shaped by the EU interact.
This article contributes to our understanding of VPAs at a time when the
forest governance debate within the EU is taking new forms. This shift might
be set in motion with an action plan to combat deforestation rather than
illegal logging. I will reflect more on this in the conclusions. The first
contribution of this article is that it introduces a multifaceted Foucauldian
understanding of power. As such, it contrasts the presentation of the EU as an
‘interest-free’ actor, a facilitator and provider of technical assistance. The
article’s second contribution is its investigation into resistance. It not only
has an empirical focus on what ‘does not work’, rather than only on what
‘works’ in terms of policy output, but also theoretically engages with the
concept of counter-conduct. It substantiates an understanding into how to not
be governed from the Malaysian side rather than just how to govern from the
EU side.
The empirical material in this article is a mix of written and oral sources.
The former are key policy documents on FLEGT and VPAs, such as the 2003
Action Plan and the 2016 Evaluation, Agence Europe references5 and VPA
Updates.6 Through the European Forest Institute (EFI) I obtained the exact
dates for all events in the EU-Malaysia VPA negotiations (see Figure 2).
Moreover, we conducted fourteen interviews with EU policy makers and
both European and Malaysian civil society.7 Finally, for a period of three
months I gathered a better understanding of VPA processes through partici-
patory observation at the EU Delegation to the Lao PDR Albeit not
in Malaysia, I gained valuable first-hand experience with an active VPA
process.
This article proceeds as follows. I will first elaborate on what entails a
policy analysis with a focus on problematization and counter-conduct. The
subsequent section deals with EU external forestry governance and the back-
ground on the EU-Malaysia VPA. This will provide evidence why FLEGT/
VPAs are a good case for a study on problematizations, and the VPA process
with Malaysia specifically for counter-conduct. The empirical sections will
focus first on what kind of problems the EU’s external forest governance aims
to address and why. Secondly, they present the findings on counter-conduct
4 C. Death, Counter-conducts: A Foucauldian Analytics of Protest, 9(3) Soc. Mov. Stud. 235–51 (2010).
5 I manually gathered and structured all references to Malaysia in Agence Europe from 1996 to 2015.
6 Through LoggingOff.info, the VPA NGO network.
7 A number of these interviews were conducted together with my colleague Elke Verhaeghe.
THE EU AND THE ‘PROBLEM’ OF ILLEGAL LOGGING 329
in the context of the VPA process with Malaysia. The conclusions wrap up
the contributions and discusses the implications of the findings.
2 A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY ANALYSIS
2.1 OF PROBLEM AND SOLUTIONS
The WPR (What is the Problem Represented to be?) approach is an analytic
strategy that puts in question the common view that the role of government is to
solve problems that sit outside them, waiting to be addressed. Rather, it considers
how governmental practices produce ‘problems’ as particular kinds of problems in a
process coined problematization. In this way policy can be understood not as an
essence or something static to be evaluated at a given point in time, but rather as a
process in which categories are made – and unmade – as objects (e.g. ‘forests’),
subjects (e.g. ‘civil society’), or places (e.g. ‘the EU’). The problematization of illegal
logging as I will discuss below produces illegality as a problem, the nation state as the
guardian of this legality and a responsible civil society as a constructive part of the
solution. The WPR approach holds several guiding questions,8 in my view not to be
strictly answered one by one, but rather to steer policy analysis with new eyes:
1. what is the problem represented to be in a specific policy or policies?
2. what deep-seated presuppositions or assumptions underlie this problem
representation?
3. how has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about?
4. what is left unproblematic in this problem representations? Where are the
silences? Can the ‘problem’ be conceptualized differently?
5. what effects (discursive, subjectification, livid) are produced by this repre-
sentation of the ‘problem’?
6. how and where has this representation of the ‘problem’ been produced,
disseminated and defended? How has it been and/or how can it be
disrupted and replaced?
7. apply this list of questions to your own problem representations.
The reference to governmental practices indicates the affiliation of the WPR
approach, and thus this article, to the Foucauldian concept of governmentality
and an understanding of discourse where knowledge production and power come
together. In short, governmentality denotes a set of rationalities and techniques for
the exercise of power which make governing possible. It brings together the
practice of governing and the necessary rationality of government that makes
8 Bacchi & Goodwin, supra n. 3.
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governing possible. Again, it is therefore not solely about how institutions ‘do’
policy and solve problems, but equally about the discourses that construct objects
or subjects of governance.9 This links to where the WPR approach specifically
focuses on what Rose & Miller called the problematics of government or the
production of problems to be addressed.10
Importantly, as Tania Li pointed to in her great book ‘The Will to
Improve’,11 the identification of a problem is intimately linked to the avail-
ability of a solution. Rather than to perceive policy as a solution to a given
problem, critical policy analysis investigates how a preconceived idea of an
appropriate solution shapes what can be considered a problem. As the saying
goes, if your main tool is a hammer then one tends to see nails everywhere. Or,
more precisely, the believe that a hammer is the best approach to any problem
brings into being the existence of nails. As I will discuss below, the format of
the solution in a VPA as a trade agreement, produces problems represented as
connected or barriers to this trade (e.g. lost revenues or unreliable verification).
Problems and solutions are thus two sides of the same coin but often, more
accurately, a catch-22.
2.2 COUNTER-CONDUCT
An important element of modern governing in general, and EU external
policies specifically, are the technologies that make the subjects of policy accept
a specific problem representation and enable them as allies in its network.12
Therefore, the comprehensive engagement of local actors – policy makers, civil
society and private sector – is often an essential part of the governing by the
EU. However, the agency that lies with the EU, or any ‘government’, to
articulate policies to address problems of a certain kind and to produce its
subjects is not absolute.
As I briefly discussed above, resistance to governing is an essential part of the
Foucauldian view on productive power that is multifaceted and relational: the
capacity to bring things, objects and subjects into being. Resistance, or counter-
conduct, is a crucial element of this capacity. This is not about grand gestures in
terms of mass-protests or revolutions – as these are more related to other forms of
9 J. Joseph, The Limits of Governmentality: Social Theory and the International, 16(2) Eur. J. Int’l Rel.
223–46 (2010).
10 N. Rose & P. Miller, Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government, 43(2) Brit. J. Soc.
173–205.
11 T. M. Li, The Will to Improve (Duke University Press 2007).
12 M. Merlingen, From Governance to Governmentality in CSDP: Towards a Foucauldian Research Agenda,
49(1) J. Com. Mkt. Stud. 149–69 (2011).
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power – but the rather mundane, day-to-day challenging or disrupting of govern-
ing. It is a set of tactics that is ‘not necessarily spectacular nor ground-breaking’.13
Counter-conduct is about speaking truth about oneself: ‘counter-conducts practice
freedom (to think and act otherwise) by bringing forth and questioning the regime
of truth through which they are engaged as objects and subjects of government’.14
Resistance thus does not (have to) come in the form of working overtly against
something but can take shape in openly embracing the assumptions of the govern-
ing as such.15
In sum, given the relational character of power, it is often by studying how people
oppose a certain way of being governed that the productive power elements of this
governing come to the fore. It is when a partner country of civil society is labelled, or
‘othered’, as non-cooperative or irresponsible that it becomes clear what is delineated
as cooperative and responsible.16 This calls for analytics of protest to investigate ‘how
protest and government are mutually constitutive, and thus how forms of resistance
have the potential to reinforce and bolster, as well as and at the same time as, under-
mining and challenging dominant forms of global governance’.17
2.3 THE EU in the world: governmentalities and resistance
With relation to EU external governance, several studies find policy to
represent problems as local and solutions as a form of self-governance. Filip
Ejdus brings this together in his discussion of local ownership.18 This is
considered as the solution in the form of local capacity and participation,
but equally identified as the key problem in any intervention. It is also about
the empowerment of the right kind of subjects19 which is not to be mistaken
for unconditional rights and opportunities for local populations. Beste Işleyen
specifically, in her study on EU twinning projects in Egypt and Tunisia,
critiques EU external governance as framing the local as a problem sphere
rather than addressing the instrumental role of the EU and other international
13 D. Bulley, Occupy Differently: Space, Community and Urban Counter-Conduct, 30(2) Glob. Soc. 238–57
(2016). Emphasis in original.
14 L. Cadman, How (Not) to be Governed: Foucault, Critique and the Political, 28(3) Env. & Plan Dev: Soc. &
Space 539–56 (2010).
15 H. Malmvig, Free Us from Power: Governmentality, Counter-conduct, and Simulation in European Democracy
and Reform Promotion in the Arab World, 8(3) Int’l Pol. Soc. 293–310 (2014).
16 L. Odysseos, C. Death, & H. Malmvig, Interrogating Michel Foucault’s Counter-Conduct: Theorising the
Subjects and Practices of Resistance in Global Politics, 30(2) Glob. Soc. 151–56 (2016).
17 Death, supra n. 4.
18 F. Ejdus, Local Ownership as International Governmentality: Evidence from the EU Mission in the Horn of
Africa, Cont. Sec. Pol. 1–23 (2017).
19 M. Kurki, Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion: The European Instrument for Democracy and
Human Rights and the Construction of Democratic Civil Societies, 5(4) Int’l Pol. Soc. 349–66 (2011).
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organizations in the reform processes of both countries.20 Jonathan Joseph
studied how EU resilience building in the Horn of Africa as governance from
a distance.21 The representation of the problem of food crises is one of local
institutions, capacity and governance yet silences external conditions or the
wider international environment. At the same time, the solution in such
representation lies with the responsibilization of local actors through self-gov-
ernance: they come to hold responsibility for their own resilience. Michael
Merlingen describes this as making people ‘complicit in their own
governance’.22 He investigated the construction of countries as problem places
in external security governance with the problem represented as shortfalls of the
local (Macedonian) police. Moreover, he described the practice of fact-finding
missions as knowledge producing practices in which the room for intervention
was defined, yet certain questions not asked. The EU’s governance finally also
reconstitutes the subjectivities of local staff through mentoring to enrol them in
their own governance.
Fairly recently, scholars started to investigate counter-conduct to EU
external governing. Helle Malmvig provides the example of political reform
in the context of EU democracy promotion towards the Arab World.
Drawing on Baudrillard’s insights on simulated reality, she argues that Arab
countries subverted the logic of political reform by the EU by simulating it to
the point where real reform could no longer be distinguished from the
simulated variant. Simply put, the EU’s governing was answered with resis-
tance in the form of pretending to undertake reform.23 Filip Ejdus provides
additional examples as he investigates the EU Capacity Building Mission
(EUCAP) in the Horn of Africa that deals with piracy and maritime security.
He critically assesses the mentality of local ownership that is operationalized as
responsibilization for externally designed objectives which he traces back to
the principles of indirect rule in late colonialism. Such forms of governance,
however, give rise to various forms of resistance both direct and indirect. This
takes shape in the difficulty in obtaining the formal invitation letters for such
an intervention given that several countries did not view piracy as their
problem or in the complaints over underestimating local knowledge in
Somaliland.24 Other examples come from Ana Juncos in her analysis of EU
security sector reform in Bosnia & Herzegovina. Local actors for example use
20 B. Işleyen, The European Union and Neoliberal Governmentality: Twinning in Tunisia and Egypt, 21(3) Eur.
J. Int’l Rel. 672–90 (2015).
21 J. Joseph, The EU in the Horn of Africa: Building Resilience as a Distant Form of Governance, 52(2) J. Com.
Mkt. Stud. 285–301 (2014).
22 Merlingen, supra n. 12.
23 Malmvig, supra n. 15.
24 Ejdus, supra n. 18.
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the vague terminology of the EU and the ‘promise’ of local contextualization
to lower the bar for reforms and undermine the credibility of the EU. This
does not eliminate responsiveness on the side of the EU, as it introduced
minimum standards along the way.25
3 CONTRIBUTION
In the following sections I will outline how exactly these investigations into
problematization and counter-conduct contribute to the existing literature on
forest governance and the VPAs. This literature is, roughly put, focused on
the – considered innovative – design of the VPAs on the one hand and their
impact on the other hand.26 Moreover, I also introduce Malaysia here as an
understudied case in this VPA literature.
As said above, the Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) are the
external branch of FLEGT and considered part of an experimentalist transna-
tional forest governance regime mainly because they are focused on the
verification of legality.27 Such VPAs produce FLEGT licenses as a guarantee
for European importers that the timber they import complies with the
national laws of the partner country. It is in the VPA design that lies a
large part of the scholarly attention for the VPAs. They are indeed firstly
different from non-governmental schemes such as the Forest Stewardship
Council (FSC) that focus on sustainability. It secondly inserts renewed impor-
tance for the role of domestic government in forest governance given the
failure of a multilateral forest governance regime.28 In sum, the VPAs are
coined an ‘innovative combination of demand and supply measures, public
and private initiatives, and coordination between developed and developing
countries’.29 It is in this corner of the literature that it is opportune to take a
step back and re-investigate the problematization of illegal logging via the
guiding questions in the WPR approach.
Furthermore, a second preoccupation of the VPA literature is a study into
the agreements’ impact in terms of trade, legal reforms, and social and
ecological indicators. VPAs and the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) for
25 A. E. Juncos, EU Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reform or Resist?, 39(1) Contemp.
Sec. Pol’y 95–118 (2018).
26 M. Derous & E. Verhaeghe, When P stands for politics. The role of the EU in the VPAs: a research agenda,
101(4) For. Pol. & Econ. 81–87 (2019).
27 C. Overdevest & J. Zeitlin, Experitmentalism in Transnational Forest Governance: Implementing EU Forest
Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership Agreements in Indonesia and Ghana,
SSRN Research Paper (2016).
28 C. L. McDermott, REDDuced: From Sustainability to Legality to Units of Carbon – The Search for Common
Interests in International Forest Governance, 35 Env. Sc. & Pol. 12–19 (2014).
29 Overdevest & Zeitlin, supra n. 26.
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example may create a trade diversion of illegal timber rather than its elimina-
tion. While the amount of illegally sourced tropical timber on the EU market
has dropped, China consolidated its position as dominant market for tropical
timber without such strict rules.30 Scholars are also critical of the benefits of a
VPA for local people whose logging activities risk to be criminalized rather
than formalized.31 Although this segment of the VPA literature puts much
more scrutiny to the legality question and its impact, it is less comprehensive
on its origins. A contextualized understanding of the problematization of
illegal logging equally forms a contribution here. Moreover, I would like to
view counter-conduct in the case of Malaysia in relation to such impact
assessments.
Despite the few examples of studies into counter-conduct, there is a tendency
in EU external governance scholarship to either ignore policy ‘failures’ or attribute
resistance to ineffectiveness on the part of the EU policy in questions. To a large
extent, resistance here eliminates a case as an appropriate case for the study of
governing given that there is no case to investigate. If a policy initiative doesn’t
materialize it largely disappears from the radar. The literature on the VPAs for
example has an overemphasis on the stories of the VPAs in Indonesia and Ghana. If
the case does hold on to attention, resistance to EU governance is, put bluntly,
often viewed as just protests or disagreements and translated into a variable that
explains the EU’s (lack of) effectiveness. These perspectives are arguably EU-
centric (i.e. only the EU as actor) and Eurocentric (i.e. true agency lies with
Europe).
I want to refocus on resistance as counter-conduct and present it as an
essential part of making and remaking policy. Given the importance of
Malaysia as a tropical timber producer, its central position in the palm oil
discussion and the country’s deforestation rate, it is surprising to see how
scholars ‘dropped out’ after the VPA came to a premature, albeit informal,
halt. It makes it a very interesting case where civil society, state-level autho-
rities and part of the private sector came to resist the problematization of
illegal logging from different angles.
30 A. Giurca, R. Jonsson, F. Rinaldi, & H. Priyadi, Ambiguity in Timber Trade Regarding Efforts to
Combat Illegal Logging: Potential Impacts on Trade Between South-East Asia and Europe, 4(4) Forests
730–50 (2013).
31 K. Buhman & I. Nathan, Plentiful Forests, Happy People? The EU’s FLEGT Approach and Its Impact on
Human Rights and Private Forestry Sustainability Schemes, 4(2) Nor. Env. Law J. 53–82 (2012); A.
Setyowati & C. L. McDermott, Commodifying Legality? Who and What Counts as Legal in the
Indonesian Wood Trade, 30(6) Soc. & Nat. Res. 750–64 (2017).
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4 THE PROBLEM WITH ILLEGAL LOGGING
4.1 THE ACTION PLAN
In the following sections, I show how the problem of illegal logging was
delineated in the FLEGT Action Plan. To delineate is the best word here: it
holds the meaning of both describing with detail and the more physical
demarcating of inside and outside. This means delineating what is part of
the problem and what is not, but also delineating what is the best venue to
address the problem and formulating solutions. All these depend on and
reinforce certain assumptions about the ‘place’ of forests, the ‘need’ for
management and the ‘appropriate’ means to do so. Whereas other EU actors
have arguably further opened the external forest governance debate (most
notably the Council in their 2003 Conclusions) they did so consistently in
relation to legality. Therefore, the Action Plan takes centre stage in the first
part of this analysis:
This document, the EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
(FLEGT), sets out a process and a package of measures through which the European
Commission proposes to address the growing problem of illegal logging and related
trade.32
The core of ‘the problem’ is illegal logging, defined as ‘when timber is
harvested in violation of national laws’. It is stipulated that ‘the EU’s wider
objective is to encourage sustainable forest management’ and forest govern-
ance is regarded as ‘an important step on the path to sustainable develop-
ment’. The problem is multifaceted, and its sub-elements have different
relationships to the core (see Figure 1). Illegal exploitation of natural resources
and forests in the problem representation is closely associated to corruption,
organized crime [1] and violent conflict [2], while undermined
economic competitiveness [3], lost revenues [4], environmental damage [5]
and the undermining of the EC’s development objectives [6] are all repre-
sented as consequences of illegal logging. Strong international demand for
timber [7] on the other hand is considered a cause, or encouragement, of
illegal logging.
32 European Commission, Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) – Proposal for an EU
Action Plan (Brussels, 2003), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:
52003DC0251.
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The problem representation paints an overall bleak picture of timber-produ-
cing countries. The lost revenues could be spent on better healthcare, education
and other public services. Moreover, illegal logging, environmental damage and
the long term negative impact on the livelihood of forest-dependent people are
mentioned together. This grouping not only hints that legal logging would not
have such a negative impact, it also links it with environmental issues rather that
the association with principles of democratic governance and respect for human
rights.
Figure 1 The Representation of the Illegal Logging as the Problem
Whereas ‘related trade’ is connected to the core of the problem, it is at the
same time at the centre of the solution. In the Action Plan, the solution
consists of seven elements of which two (support to timber-producing coun-
tries and conflict timber) direct the supply of legal timber, the other five the
demand side. The latter, among others, link export permits (the licensing
scheme) to the benefit of importers, but also for participating countries in
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terms of increased market confidence, increased revenues and additional
enforcement tools. The supply side solutions indicate where timber-produ-
cing countries need support. As such, the part of the solutions that lay outside
the EU represent more elements of the problem. The encouragement of
greater transparency, for example, deals at the same time with the ‘problem’
(limited or lack of transparency) and the ‘solution’ (the encouragement by
donors). Another sub-element of the ‘solution’ in terms of the supply side is
capacity building as ‘[p]artner governments need donor support to implement
broad governance reforms, for example in the judiciary, the police and the
military.’ This at the same time problematizes the current state of governance
in partner countries in these fields. The same goes for reliable verification
systems and policy reforms as part of the solution.
The specifics of this problematization in the Action Plan hold specific
silences, elements that are not part of the problem representation. The core
problem could have been deforestation, or (unsustainable) palm oil production,
but it is not. To have illegal logging at the centre of the problem representation
largely closes the door for a thorough discussion on too much legal logging. As
mentioned above, the link between illegal logging and deforestation is one
where the former ‘can be a contributory factor’ to the latter. Overall, what is
not problematized in the Action Plan is the legal framework for forestry, its
fairness or justness. The problem lies with corrupt elements, illegal business
activities and weak law enforcement. By identifying these problems, the solu-
tion in the form of a reliable system to distinguish legal from illegal production
comes as natural.
4.2 DISCUSSION
Silences are rarely accidents. I argue they serve to sustain certain assumptions
and produce a coherent story of the EU as a global actor. This does not refer
to the academic debate on policy coherence, it be vertical or horizontal, nor
is it about ‘testing’ the normative power of the Union. It is rather an inquiry
in the productive power to bring into being a version of both the EU ‘self’
and the working of the world. The study of silences, through counterfactuals,
allows to fully grasp the often-invisible assumptions of the problematization.
It allows to see them not as policy decisions, but as incontestable pre-
decisions.
A coherent story about the EU, and the assumptions that trickle through
into the VPAs, is one of an actor that abides to multilateral trade rules. In this
story there is the inevitable ‘need’ for trade-based solutions that conserves the
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sovereignty of the partner country. Imagine the EU banning palm oil – its
plantations arguably a source for deforestation – or even tropical timber
altogether. This would trigger reaction from palm oil producing countries33
in the form of bringing this before the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism.
The ‘decision’ to focus on the legality of traded forestry products then is on
the one hand an example of the EU abiding to WTO rules, yet on the other
hand an example of how the EU wants to be an actor that is abiding to WTO
rules. This means that the EU is not only driven by the institutional rules of
the WTO (i.e. institutional power) but also the assumption that these rules
are good (i.e. productive power). This highlights the trade-rules-based think-
ing of the EU that also drives the (later) design of the VPAs. It makes that the
market-based solutions in the VPAs are not policy decisions that could have
been otherwise, but rather that non-market-based solutions were off the table
even before the launch of the FLEGT Action Plan.
These market-based solutions are also part of pre-defined assumptions of ‘what works’.
Again, these assumptions bound and delineate the problematization and the domain for
intervention. In the FLEGT Action Plan, the format of the VPAs is still in a draft version:
the name VPA is not even introduced yet. When the VPAs substantiated from 2007
onwards their market-based features took example from other forest conservation initia-
tives such as REDD+34 which in turn where criticized for treating forest conservation and
the future of our planet as market externalities.35 REDD+ shows that the EU is not the
only one to relate forestry questions to their market value, yet the FLEGT licenses also
follow preceding assumptions within the EU about ‘what works’ in the realm of trade and
sustainable development. The forestry – trade linkage, however, is not a first with the
VPAs. Not only do contemporary EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have a distinct
chapter on sustainable development that, when relevant, mentions forestry products, there
is EU precedent of linking trade in general to tropical wood. The GSP (Generalized
System of Preferences) since late 1990s referred to special incentive arrangements that
allowed for additional preferences if partner countries incorporate in their domestic law
the standards of the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO):36
33 This is a reasonable assumption given various statements by Malaysia and Indonesia concerning the
biofuel sustainability criteria in the promotion of renewable energies (2009/28/EC). Both countries
stated they would monitor the implementation of the directive and assess if it forms a non-tariff barrier
for the imports of palm oil into the EU.
34 Given that deforestation and forest degradation account for over 10 % of CO2 emissions, Reduced
Emissions through Avoided Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) aim to correct ‘so-called
market failure in sustainable forest management through ascribing monetary values to standing forest
that would cover the opportunity costs of alternative land use and so make conservation more
profitable than destruction’, n. 37.
35 R. Fletcher, W. Dressler, B. Büscher & Z. R. Anderson, Questioning REDD+ and the Future of Market-
Based Conservation, 30(3) Conser. Bio. 673–75 (2016).
36 Council of the European Union, COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2820/98 of 21 Dec. 1998
Applying a Multiannual Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences for the Period 1 July 1999 to 31 Dec. 2001
(Brussels 1998).
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As from 1 January 1998 special incentive arrangements in the form of additional
preferences may be granted to beneficiary countries covered by the scheme which
request such arrangements in writing and provide proof that they have adopted and
actually apply domestic legal provisions incorporating the substance of the
standards laid down by the lTTO relating to the sustainable management of forests.
There was thus always the assumption that trade incentives ‘work’ when it
comes to forestry. The VPA set-up thus (re)produces a story of the attrac-
tiveness of the EU market and the subsequent willingness for reforms that
stems from it. Whether or not trade data can substantiate this attractiveness in
terms of size is variable across cases yet overall what is more important is the
(belief that the) credibility of the legal system relates to the possibility to
export to the EU. This is not only a matter to test ex-post, but also what I
argue as an important assumption within the EU ex-ante the set-up of the
VPAs.
5 RESISTANCE IN MALAYSIA
5.1 A TIMELINE
The EU-Malaysia VPA negotiations started in January 2007 (see Figure 2).
Malaysia was considered a crucial country in the VPA story given its declining
tropical forest cover. Credible licensing was assessed as being possible in the
short term in Malaysia as national certification systems were already being
considered at the time.37 Ten years later, however, the talks are not close to
an agreement as the involved actors disagreed on almost everything. Initially,
enthusiasm reigned, and the Netherlands was the Member State to allocate a lot
of resources to the process.38 The process first cooled as indigenous peoples’
groups decided to leave in 2008. The re-launch of the talks in April 2012,
however, was without the State of Sarawak. This proved to be a decisive
hurdle and the negotiations stalled in 2014 in contrast to the successful con-
clusion the EU-Indonesia VPA. Malaysian exporters, however, had to find a
way to prove due diligence as required by the EU Timber Regulation (see
infra). Technical progress on the legality definitions in the VPA however
continued throughout 2016–2017. For political impetus into the EU-Malaysia
37 Interview 11.
38 VPA processes are driven by the European Commission (DG ENVI for Asia, DG DEVCO for Africa)
together with the European Forest Institute (EFI). In each of the processes however there also one of
the Member States that gets involved. This was e.g. Germany in Cameroon and the UK in Ghana
(interview 8).
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VPA, the EU is looking at the new Malaysian government elected in May
2018.39
Figure 2 Timeline of the EU-Malaysia VPA40
A major hurdle was thus the decision by the province of Sarawak to not participate
in a future VPA.41 In 2009, the Sarawak Timber Association (STA) had
denounced some of the core elements of the FLEGT VPA with the EU: a
common ground for the definition of legal timber and native rights over land.
The Association stumbled over what it called restrictive import and export
requirements, and conditionalities in a ‘involuntary’ Voluntary Partnership
Agreement.42 The Sarawak regional political establishment was quick to follow
the STA’s position. Sarawak is the largest Malaysian state and is one of two (the
other is Sabah) states on the island of Borneo (see Figure 3). As Malaysia is a
federation, the state-level holds the power over, most relevant here, land conces-
sions. The drop out of Sarawak undermines the entire VPA with the rest of
Malaysia and limits the impact of the VPA as the province is the largest timber
producing region of the country. Whereas there was ultimately ‘a lot of agreed
text, [there was] no agreement on how such a VPA would deal with Sarawak’.43
39 Interview 14.
40 Within this timeframe, the EU and Malaysia also negotiated on a Free Trade Agreement. These talks
however stalled after seven rounds in 2012 (interview 1). Officially the government of Malaysia wanted to
secure a stronger mandate in the 2013 elections, yet sensitive issues (access to the services market, access to
public contracts, protection of intellectual property rights and sustainable development) blocked any further
progress after that; see Agence Europe, Possible resumption of free-trade talks early in 2015 (2014).
41 Interview 5.
42 Sarawak Timber Association, Myth, Facts & Reality of EU FLEGT VPA: Sarawak’s Perspective (STA
2009).
43 Interview 14.
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Figure 3 Map of Malaysia
The other major issue during the negotiations has been the inclusion of civil
society and local communities. From the beginning several groups were dismem-
bered as their representatives were denied free movement within Malaysia. During
the consultation process civil society groups were presented with (only) some of
the texts but their comments were mostly discarded.44 Neither the domestic
steering or negotiating committee for the VPA process had representatives from
civil society organizations or indigenous peoples’ organizations included. By the
4th Technical Working Group meeting (in 2008) several organizations had
decided to leave the process,45 given that these experiences made several partici-
pants relive earlier struggles regarding forest certification in Malaysia since the late
1990s.46 Overall, the groups denied legitimizing the consistent refusal by the
Malaysian government to recognize the customary tenure rights of indigenous
peoples.
44 Interview 8; 10.
45 L. Duffield, S. Ozinga, M. Richards, A. Bollen, & R. Kohnert, Making Forestry Fairer: A Practical Guide
for Civil Society Organisations Taking Part in FLEGT VPA negotiations. (FERN 2014).
46 Interview 9.
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5.2 RESISTANCE
The VPA architecture activates civil society, as the representatives of the commu-
nity, to partake in its own governing. The participation of non-governmental
groups and the private sector is indeed viewed as an essential element in the
legitimation of the solution of legality assurance. Significant elements of both
groups in Malaysia, however, have resisted the EU’s governing and the problem
representation it holds by ‘speaking truth’ and non-participation in this self-
governing.
The Sarawak Timber Council (STA) is one actor that has resisted the EU’s
problem representation. In October 2009, they published a booklet titled ‘Myth,
Facts and Reality of EU FLEGT VPA: Sarawak’s Perspective’. This implies that:
(1) there are elements of the FLEGT VPA (process) that are not real (not
true),
(2) ‘Sarawak’ is in the capacity to distinguish between what is real and
what is not,
(3) the STA represents the Sarawak perspective.
Directly from the preface onwards the STA distinguishes between the ‘original
intent’ of FLEGT, namely differentiating between illegal and legal timber and
preventing the former from entering the EU market, and the ‘real intentions’. This
is the myth from the title: the EU is here to prevent illegally logged timber
(products) from entering its market yet the reality is that there are other intentions
as well. STA contends the solution of the Action Plan: ‘demand-side pressure for
reform’. The STA is not convinced that the access to the EU market is sufficient as
supply-side support. Given that the STA believes the legal framework for forestry-
related activities in Sarawak is working properly, it is not convinced of the added
value of setting up this licensing scheme. This is because:
(1) the amount of exports from Sarawak to the EU is very low,
(2) non-FLEGT timber would still be allowed to enter the EU market,
and
(3) the demand side is apparently not willing to pay a price premium for
legal timber.
In addition, the STA takes issue with the broad problem construction of the
Action Plan in terms of environmental issues, sustainable development, policy
decisions and the livelihood of forest-dependent people. The STA picks up several
elements of other discourses. Regarding the rights of natives, there is the link with
the overall ‘racial harmony’ argument within Malaysia (i.e. very calculated dis-
tributive policies). The booklet also picks up the debate on diminishing policy
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spaces for developing nations, with the specific meaning of ‘autonomy in deter-
mining how best to use and apply its natural resources’.47 Moreover, the STA does
not agree with the inclusion of ‘emotional issues’ such as native customary laws and
native rights over land yet emphasizes what the timber industry has accomplished
in terms of corporate social responsibility: ‘logging companies have repeatedly
gone above and beyond the norm by enabling developmental conditions to
improve the native’s quality of life. … companies have undertaken this corporate
social responsibility at their own great expense’. According to the STA, these
broader objectives, poverty reduction, growth, and sustainable development,
should be ‘separated from the licensing scheme as they cloud the original intent
of the Action Plan to curb illegal logging and associated trade’.
The central argument of indigenous peoples represented by a consortium at
the time called JOANGOHUTAN has been that their legal protection has not
been adequate for their well-being. Indigenous peoples have access to the Courts
to safeguard their land rights which is contained in the existing law system.
However, they argue that they have been to the courts, and they have achieved
rulings in their favor.48 This does not take away that the logging of forests has been
official state policy for decades and the legal protection of the rights of natives to
establish Native Customary Rights has not been able to keep up with the issuing of
licenses and leases for logging and plantations. JOANGOHUTAN does not share
the problem-solution identification of the EU. The problem is not the lack of
enforcement of forest law, the problem is not corrupt ‘elements’. The problem is
an imbalance between those with power (state officials) and those without
(natives). Therefore, these groups also don’t believe in the proposed solution of
licensing:
‘I would say their main concern because the whole legality question is in a very static, in a
very scientific … , technical way. It doesn’t look into the substantive of what do they
mean by customary land rights. […] Legality for them means […] from a very technical
aspect which is written up in the paper […] how they define legality. Whereas for the
indigenous peoples’ groups and also for the NGOs supporting the indigenous peoples
demands, legality itself cannot be seen from the technical point. It has to incorporate […]
the whole bigger picture of how land and forest are part and parcel of not just for
economic value but also for the spiritual, for their […] economic needs, for their social,
for their governance as people who rely on that resources’.49
Their response has been to re-politicize the entire process. The non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) representing indigenous peoples have brought their
demands for political change to the VPA table. They have not limited their
47 Sarawak Timber Council, supra n. 42.
48 C. Yong, Forest Governance in Malaysia – An NGO Perspective (JOANGOHutan 2006).
49 Interview 9.
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input to a technical discussion of setting up a monitoring system for labels
indicating legality but have questioned the value of legality for the overall protec-
tion of the livelihood of indigenous peoples. When they did not see progress in
this regard, they left the process altogether. In the first half of 2008
JOANGOHUTAN, JOAS (another group in support of indigenous communities)
and the Sarawak Indigenous Lawyers Association (SILA) left the multistakeholder
consultations that supported the Technical Working Groups.
5.3 DISCUSSION
Both the STA and the indigenous peoples’ groups resisted EU (external forest)
governance by ‘speaking truth’, by contesting the problem representation pro-
duced by the EU. Of course, this is (also) a case of competing interests in which
the STA and JOANGOHUTAN statements relate to the distinct governing of
Sarawak vis-à-vis the Peninsular, a history of legal battles over native lands, and a
system of extraction of natural resources that benefits those in power. However,
the EU-Malaysia VPA episode is also one of resistance to the assumptions in the
EU’s problematizations. Their resistance challenges the coherence of the ‘EU
story’ that draws on illegality and trade as ‘inevitable’ problems and solutions
respectively. Both have taken part in the platform that is provided in the EU’s
governing and used it to ‘speak truth’.
The STA engaged with the assumptions of the EU’s problematizations, took
them on and then challenged them. The Sarawak-based timber association rhet-
orically agrees that the legal system should be sustained, and that illegality is bad for
business. They however challenge the EU’s assumptions about its rules-based
engagement (i.e. a hidden agenda) and the attractiveness of its market. The latter
is a credible statement for Sarawak. Whereas the EU market makes for about 10%
of the export earnings of timber and timber products from Malaysia (538 million
USD for 2017) only 0.52% of these stems from Sarawak. Peninsular Malaysia
exporters, who provide over 97% of all exports to the EU, found a way to comply
with the EU Timber Regulation through MyTLAS: a legality verification system
based on the draft TLAS from the VPA.50 The system seems to override any need
for further VPA engagement.51
By engaging in the multistakeholder platform in the first place, by, in part,
acknowledging the EU as a legitimate actor to set up these fora for discussion, civil
society actors are part of the production of the EU as a legitimate actor, and the
50 Malaysian Timber Industry Board, Malaysia: Country Progress on Timber Legality Assurance Efforts (MTIB
2018).
51 Interview 10.
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problems and solutions it puts forward. However, the groups I discussed above also
resisted this production by offering their own knowledges about the role of forest
(lands) and the problems at hand. Moreover, by refusing further engagement they
were able to (re)produce themselves as a non-cooperative civil society, rather than
the cooperative civil society the EU had aimed to bring into being as part of the
legitimizing of its solution.
Whereas EU actors were largely supportive of the groups’ response,52 there
were questions on whether their leaving was a strategically good decision.53
Moreover, the lack of inclusiveness did not automatically make the VPA process
invalid54 as it indeed did continue for years after these groups left. To some extent,
the episode marks a process of how those that signal ‘the problem’ become ‘the
problem’ especially by those that don’t want the register the problem as such.55
There was (and is) a strong emphasis on the capacity of civil society to deal with
the issues in the VPAs. In short, signalling alternative views to illegality as the
problem, gets often reinterpreted as lacking the capacity to understand legality.
Such assumptions are strongly embedded in the EU funding for capacity-building
in VPA processes56 and even trickle through into the self-image of civil society
groups:
‘The other reason also because […] in terms of capacity you must know [there was]
nobody really to coordinate. Funding wasn’t the problem because FERN was ever ready
to […] fund somebody to do the work […]. So that was not a reason, but more capacity
and also the issues were quite complicated for the different groups to take up because that
among themselves they have also differences as well’.57
6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This article has first taken a step back from the assessments of EU external forest
governance and investigated in depth the problematizations in the FLEGT Action
Plan. The assumptions we found therein are an unwavering belief in illegality as
the problem and licensing as the solution. Other EU actors have arguably widened
the interpretation of the Action Plan – this could be an avenue for further
research – but have kept the linkages to legality and trade-based solutions intact.
52 Interview 10; 14.
53 Interview 6.
54 Interview 5.
55 See S. Ahmed, Problems with Names (2014), https://feministkilljoys.com/2014/04/25/problems-with-
names/.
56 Several NGOs attract EU funding for capacity-building projects in the VPA partner countries, of
which FERN is best-known. This funding can stem from the governance pillar under the EIDHR, or,
for Asian VPA countries, the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). Moreover, the EU FAO
FLEGT Programme also covers support for local communities.
57 Interview 9.
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Secondly, this article discussed the case of the EU-Malaysia VPA not as a case of
governance failure but rather as a case of counter-conduct. It studies the engage-
ment of Malaysian actors with what the EU had produced as ‘problems’ and
‘solutions’.
Theoretically, this article serves as a critique to what is taken-for-granted in
the EU’s external forest governance. It is an analysis:
that focuses on the grounds of the system’s possibility. The critique reads backwards from what
seems natural, obvious, self-evident, or universal to show that these things have their history,
their reasons for being the way they are, their effects on what follows from them, and that the
starting point is not a (natural) given but a (cultural) construct, usually blind to itself.58
What I find is that the productive power that lies in the EU’s governance truly is a
relational power. The production of problems and solutions may originate from
the FLEGT Action Plan, Malaysian actors equally put forward their alternative
views and knowledges. The ultimate response of the actors we discussed has been
the elusion from the process yet not without engaging with the EU’s assumptions.
This does not mean that the material effects of this power are the same. ‘Business-
as-usual’ in the province of Sarawak means the continued extraction of natural
resources to serve the Asian markets, whereas indigenous groups are confronted
with MyTLAS that still largely excludes reference to customary land rights.
This does not mean that I advocate the exit by the EU in global forest
governance. This article shows that EU is an important player in setting the
scene and nourishing certain assumptions. This scene is one of confrontation and
its deconstruction is not only an ex-post view on how power operates but also
holds perspective and optimism.59 This article shows that problems and solutions,
and their assumptions are not absolute. The problem can be deforestation – as
several actors in the EU setting would like to achieve – and the solution can
consider more of the local knowledges.
Table 1 List of Interviews
1 23 January 2014 EU Delegation
2 03 February 2014 EU Commission
3 04 February 2014 Embassy Malaysia
4 27 January 2015
58 B. Johnson, Translator’s Introduction, in Dissemination (J. Derrida, University of Chicago Press 1981);
Bacchi & Goodwin, supra n. 3.
59 B. Donegan, Governmental Regionalism: Power/Knowledge and Neoliberal Regional Integration in Asia and
Latin America, 35(1) Millenium 23–51 (2006).
THE EU AND THE ‘PROBLEM’ OF ILLEGAL LOGGING 347
5 18 August 2015 FLEGT Facility
6 10 February 2017 Civil society EU
7 27 September 2017 Civil society EU
8 23 November 2017 Civil society EU
9 04 December 2018 Civil society Malaysia
10 05 December 2018 Civil society Malaysia
11 06 December 2018 Consultant
12 06 December 2018 European Commission
13 13 December 2018 European Commission
14 20 December 2018 European Commission
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